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Summary

George Rozanski has more than 25 years of experience in antitrust analysis.  He consults on the competitive effects of mergers and acquisitions and provides antitrust analysis of alleged anticompetitive conduct, including vertical restraints, IP licensing practices, and price-fixing. Dr. Rozanski′s expertise includes the use of econometrics for demand estimation and merger simulation. He has substantial experience analyzing candidate theories of competitive effects in a wide range of industries, both in civil litigation and before US antitrust agencies.

Prior to joining Bates White, Dr. Rozanski served as Chief of the Economic Regulatory Section of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice. In that role, Dr. Rozanski analyzed proposed mergers and acquisitions, single-firm conduct, and proposed changes in economic regulations and legislation that could affect competition and market outcomes. He had responsibility for conducting, supervising, and presenting the agency’s economic analysis in numerous investigations and litigations involving a wide variety of industries, including telecommunications, banking and financial services, intermediate capital goods, differentiated consumer products, Internet music and video distribution services, financial trading platforms, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, steel, defense, and homogeneous manufactured goods.

Dr. Rozanski earned his SB in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology prior to obtaining his MA and PhD in economics from Harvard.

Selected Work

Selected Experience

  • On behalf of DuPont, analyzed likely competitive effects of its proposed merger with Dow Chemical in a wide range of markets, including seeds and transgenic traits, agricultural chemicals, and specialty polymers.
  • On behalf of Express Scripts, provided analysis for its acquisition of MyMatrixx and, previously, its acquisition of Medco.
  • On behalf of parties seeking to combine their purchasing of generic pharmaceuticals, co-led a team in performing detailed economic analysis to assess whether the expanded Group Purchasing Organization would have anticompetitive buyer market power, also referred to as monopsony power.
  • On behalf of CEMEX, S.A.B. de C.V. (“CEMEX”) and Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, S.A.B. de C.V. (“GCC”), conducted analysis presented to the Federal Trade Commission in support of a transfer of manufacturing and distribution assets for cement from CEMEX to GCC.
  • Working on behalf of merging hospitals, identified competitive overlaps, assessed relevant markets, and analyzed likely competitive effects.

  • On behalf of Holcim Ltd. and Lafarge SA, which proposed a $25 billion merger that would create the world’s largest cement manufacturer, analyzed potential competitive effects in both the United States and Canada for aggregates, ready-mix concrete, and cement.

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