Mathis Wagner, PhD

Mathis Wagner is a Principal in the Antitrust and Competition Practice at Bates White. He is an expert in the empirical methods used in antitrust and competition analysis, the economics of monopolization, experimental/survey design and evaluation, and the analysis of issues related to labor markets. Recently, he supported testifying experts in large monopolization cases in the tech industry and in the data management software industry in Apple v. Qualcomm, American Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, and Sandoz and Raregen v. United Therapeutics Corporation and Smiths Medical; supported the Department of Justice’s proposed expert in a Tunney Act proceeding related to the merger of CVS Health and Aetna; and, on behalf of Willis Towers Watson (WTW), assisted at all stages of merger review in connection with the $30 billion proposed merger between Aon and WTW.

Prior to joining Bates White, Dr. Wagner was a faculty member at Boston College, where he taught courses in microeconomics and labor economics at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. His research includes work on the impact of consolidation on premiums in Medicare Part D, optimal experimental/survey design, the impact of immigration and refugees in host countries, the determinants of migration decisions, and the incentives inherent in the design of old-age social security. Dr. Wagner has extensive experience consulting with the World Bank, including designing and analyzing a survey and using program evaluation techniques to advise TalentCorp Malaysia on the design of its Returning Expert Program to incentivize high-skill expatriates to return to Malaysia; he also evaluated the labor market impact of Syrian refugees in Turkey. He has published in peer-reviewed journals such as the Journal of Health Economics, Journal of Labor Economics, World Bank Economic Review, Experimental Economics, Economic Inquiry, and the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

PhD, Economics, University of Chicago

MA, Economics, University of Chicago

BA, Economics, University of Cambridge

• Served as lead consulting expert for the plaintiff in a large monopolization case in the tech industry. Supported testifying expert regarding issues of market definition, market power, and competitive effects.
• On behalf of a client in the data management software industry, conducted analysis in support of expert presentation before the Federal Trade Commission’s Technology Task Force regarding possible anticompetitive behavior by a competitor.
• On behalf of Willis Towers Watson (WTW), assisted at all stages of merger review in connection with the $30 billion proposed merger between Aon and WTW, including preliminary antitrust risk assessment, Hart-Scott-Rodino–related submissions, and responses to the DOJ's second request to multiple advocacy submissions and presentations to the DOJ and the Canadian Competition Bureau.
• Conducted analysis and supported DOJ’s expert in a Tunney Act proceeding related to the merger of CVS Health and Aetna.
• In Sandoz Inc. and Raregen, LLC v. United Therapeutics Corporation and Smiths Medical ASD, Inc., provided consulting and expert support regarding issues of market definition, market power, competitive effects, and irreparable harm on behalf of United Therapeutics and Smiths Medical in connection with Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants from enforcing allegedly exclusionary contracts pertaining to ambulatory infusion pumps used to administer Remodulin® (treprostinil) Injections.
• On behalf of Apple in its litigation against Qualcomm, provided support to the expert in analyzing the extent of Qualcomm’s market power in modem chipsets; Qualcomm’s conduct with respect to original equipment manufacturers (OEM), including Apple; and the effects of Qualcomm’s conduct on OEMs and Qualcomm’s rivals. 
• On behalf of American Express in American Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litigation II, provided support to the expert. Analyzed Amex’s market power and agreements with merchants to opine on whether Amex’s agreements with merchants serve or restrict competition.