Photo of Nicholas D. Hill, PhD

Selected Industries

  • Airlines
  • Banking and financial services
  • Beer
  • Dairy
  • Funeral and cemetery services
  • Gaming
  • Health insurance
  • Oilfield services
  • Pharmaceuticals
  • Pulp and paper
  • Telecommunications

Nicholas D. Hill, PhD

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Nicholas Hill is an expert in antitrust issues and has supervised or led investigations on matters in a wide range of industries, including telecommunications, pharmaceuticals (branded and generic), airlines, health insurance, banking, oilfield services, paper, beer, dairy, and bread. He developed a capacity closure model that is now commonly used by the agencies and practitioners to analyze paper mergers.

Prior to joining Bates White in August 2017, Dr. Hill served as assistant section chief in the Economic Analysis Group of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, and was an Economist in the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission. During his time at these institutions he filled a wide range of roles, including that of economic expert.

For more about Dr. Hill joining Bates White, see the articles from GCR and FTC Watch.

Selected Experience

  • Managed the economics team on the Antitrust Division’s successful litigation to block the proposed merger between Aetna and Humana. Helped prepare the testimony and reports of the Division’s economic, industry, divestiture, and efficiencies experts. The team won a US Attorney General's Award for Distinguished Service.

  • Analyzed the acquisition by Novartis of GSK’s oncology drugs and GSK’s acquisition of Novartis’s vaccine division (excluding influenza assets) for the Federal Trade Commission. Novartis agreed to divest its BRAK and MEK inhibitors assets to secure FTC approval of the deal. At the time of the transaction, GSK marketed a BRAK inhibitor, a MEK inhibitor, and a combination therapy, all of which were used to treat late-stage melanoma. Novartis had BRAK and MEK inhibitors, as well as a combination therapy, at a late stage of development. GSK’s acquisition of Novartis vaccine assets was approved without condition.
  • Provided economic analysis of Sun Pharmaceutical’s acquisition of Ranbaxy Laboratories. Both firms manufactured generic drugs for sale in the United States. Sun agreed to divest Ranbaxy’s generic minocycline business to ensure approval of the deal by the Federal Trade Commission. The case turned on future competition: Ranbaxy produced various strength minocycline tablets and Sun was a likely future producer.
  • Oversaw the economic analysis of the Antitrust Division’s litigation to block the proposed sale of slots at Newark Airport from Delta to United. The economic team used empirical analysis to support the proposed market definition (which defined Newark Airport as a separate geographic market), to measure the likely competitive effects, and to evaluate the parties’ efficiency claims. The team won a US Antitrust Division Award of Distinction.
  • Led the pre-litigation analysis of economic issues on the proposed merger of Halliburton and Baker Hughes. This sprawling matter included a massive number of product markets, each of which had a unique story. The team won a US Antitrust Division Award of Distinction.
  • Managed the economics team on the Antitrust Division’s investigation into the proposed merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable. A key area of focus was how increasing the size of an MVPD affects the fees that it pays to programmers. The team used a combination of empirical and theoretical analysis to answer this question and to answer the related question of whether large Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can charge higher interconnection fees than smaller ISPs. The team won a US Antitrust Division Award of Distinction.
  • Provided economic analysis for three separate paper mergers: Abitibi-Bowater, Graphic Packaging-Altivity, and International Paper-Temple Inland. In the course of these investigations, developed the capacity closure model, which is a dominant-firm merger simulation. It weighs a dominant firm’s incentive to increase price by closing mills (i.e., the additional margin it can earn on its mills that remain open) against the cost of such closures (i.e., lost profits at the closed mills). The model requires only data that are commonly available in the paper industry and can easily accommodate the effect of efficiencies and competitor supply responses. This work was recognized as the best theory work in the DOJ Economic Analysis Group in 2008–2009.
  • In United States v. Abitibi Consolidated, Inc., prepared and submitted declaration in a Tunney Act proceeding. Argued that the relief that the settlement the DOJ obtained in the Abitibi-Bowater case was in the public interest. Declaration cited repeatedly in the judge’s opinion, ruling in favor of the DOJ. This work was recognized as the best litigation work in the DOJ Economic Analysis Group in 2008–2009.
  • Prepared declaration analyzing the proposed merger between Jostens and American Achievement Corporation, two of the three largest makers of high school and college class rings. The Commission issued a complaint seeking to block the merger, charging that the proposed merger would likely be anticompetitive and lead to higher prices and reduced service. The parties abandoned their merger plans. This work was recognized with a Federal Trade Commission Certificate of Appreciation.
  • Led the economic analysis of all banking matters before the DOJ Antitrust Division, including the mergers of Huntington-First Merit and KeyCorp-First Niagara, among others. Also oversaw the economic analysis of the merger between subprime lenders Springleaf and OneMain.
  • Analyzed fluid milk and school milk competition in the DOJ Antitrust Division's litigation to undo Dean Foods' acquisition of the Foremost Farm milk-processing assets. Key contributions included writing a series of memos that helped develop the theory of harm and laid out when and how efficiencies created by the deal would be passed through to consumers. This work was recognized as the best written work in the DOJ Economic Analysis Group in 2009–2010.
  • Analyzed competition on three separate investigations in the beer industry: Miller-Coors, InBev-Anheuser Busch, and ABI-Grupo Modelo. The InBev-Anheuser Busch matter led to the divestiture of the Labatt’s brand despite the fact that Labatt’s national market share was miniscule, a recognition of the economic evidence that beer markets are local (Labatt’s was popular in parts of upstate New York). Similarly, economic analysis supported the divestiture of the Grupo Modelo brands in the United States, and this was the outcome of the matter.

Education

PhD, Economics, Johns Hopkins University

MsC, Quantitative Development Economics, University of Warwick

BA, Economics and International Studies, University of Warwick

Events