Photo of George A. Rozanski, PhD

Selected Expertise

  • Damages estimation
  • Econometrics
  • Industrial organization
  • Joint ventures
  • Mergers and acquisitions
  • Monopolization
  • Price-fixing
  • Single-firm conduct

Selected Industries

  • Banking and financial services
  • Biotechnology
  • Chemicals
  • Consumer products
  • Defense
  • Financial services
  • Healthcare
  • Manufacturing
  • Payment cards
  • Securities

George A. Rozanski, PhD

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George Rozanski has more than 25 years of experience in antitrust analysis.  He consults on the competitive effects of mergers and acquisitions and provides antitrust analysis of alleged anticompetitive conduct, including vertical restraints, IP licensing practices, and price-fixing. Dr. Rozanski′s expertise includes the use of econometrics for demand estimation and merger simulation. He has substantial experience analyzing candidate theories of competitive effects in a wide range of industries, both in civil litigation and before US antitrust agencies.

Prior to joining Bates White, Dr. Rozanski served as Chief of the Economic Regulatory Section of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice. In that role, Dr. Rozanski analyzed proposed mergers and acquisitions, single-firm conduct, and proposed changes in economic regulations and legislation that could affect competition and market outcomes. He had responsibility for conducting, supervising, and presenting the agency’s economic analysis in numerous investigations and litigations involving a wide variety of industries, including telecommunications, banking and financial services, intermediate capital goods, differentiated consumer products, Internet music and video distribution services, financial trading platforms, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, steel, defense, and homogeneous manufactured goods.

Dr. Rozanski earned his SB in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology prior to obtaining his MA and PhD in economics from Harvard.

Selected Experience

  • Conducted extensive economic analysis on behalf of Express Scripts in connection with its $29 billion acquisition of Medco Health Solutions. The analysis, which was presented to the Federal Trade Commission as well as state enforcement agencies, showed adverse competitive effects were unlikely in any relevant market. Bid data were used both to investigate the current structure of competition and to calibrate merger simulation models that demonstrated there would be no unilateral incentive to increase price after accounting for anticipated efficiencies. The analysis also addressed possible coordinated effects and monopsony concerns. The FTC unconditionally approved the merger after an eight month investigation, finding no likelihood of unilateral effects, coordinated effects, or exercise of monopsony power.
  • Provided analysis on behalf of Grifols in connection with its acquisition of Talecris, two companies involved in the manufacture and sale of plasma-derived therapies used to treat a range of conditions, such as immune system diseases and bleeding disorders. Evaluated possible coordinated effects concerns related to the merger and assessed the merger specificity of claimed efficiencies in analysis presented to FTC. FTC approved the Grifols/Talecris transaction after Grifols agreed to a consent decree that facilitated entry.
  • In Omnicare v. United Health, served as a testifying expert for United Health to assess damages in a lawsuit alleging that premerger coordination led to the joint exercise of monopsony power. Performed rigorous econometric analysis to simulate but-for pricing and estimate total damages for a range of but-for scenarios. Analysis revealed premerger coordination likely would not have a significant impact.
  • Provided analysis to Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines in connection with their proposed merger which was investigated by DOJ. Identified antitrust risks, conducted a retrospective merger analysis on the airline industry, and coauthored a white paper that analyzed likely merger price effects and that was presented to DOJ.
  • Provided analysis to both FTC and EC on behalf of a customer concerned about possible vertical and horizontal effects of Google’s proposed acquisition of DoubleClick in the online advertising industry.
  • Appeared before FTC on behalf of Batesville Casket Company, a leading firm in the death care industry, in connection with a merger that raised both horizontal and vertical concerns. Presented rigorous statistical analysis of natural experiments and previous mergers. FTC’s second request investigation was closed without any divestitures being required.
  • Appeared before DOJ in connection with its investigation of the proposed acquisition of Delta and Pine Land Company by Monsanto, a significant acquisition in the agricultural biotechnology industry that raised both horizontal and vertical concerns. Made multiple presentations based on independent research and data analysis. Monsanto agreed to a consent decree that included divestitures designed to address the competitive concerns.
  • Served as DOJ′s expert witness in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., et al. and United States v. Gillette Co., two early examples of unilateral effects analysis.