LESLIE M. MARX, PhD

Partner

Leslie M. Marx is a professor of economics at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. She is an expert in auctions, vertical contracting, antitrust liability, and cartels. Dr. Marx is well known for her innovative ideas in the areas of industrial organization, applied game theory, auctions, procurements, and collusion. Dr. Marx also served as the Chief Economist of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from August 2005 through August 2006.

Dr. Marx has published extensively in peer-reviewed journals and elsewhere on topics related to industrial organization, applied game theory, auctions, procurements, and collusion. Her published work includes papers on collusive mechanisms, incentives in procurement contracting, slotting allowances, and exclusive dealing.

Selected Experience

  • Served as a testifying expert in In re Electrical Carbon Products Antitrust Litigation. Submitted an expert report on damages.
  • In In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, served as a consulting expert. Worked closely with Bates White professionals to examine whether the economic evidence was inconsistent with noncooperative conduct during a period of time predating the defendants′ guilty pleas.
  • Provided an expert report and deposition testimony for Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation in litigation that concerned Oxford Health Plans′ settlement negotiations in a securities class action lawsuit.

Education

PhD, Economics, Northwestern University

BS, Mathematics, Duke University

Insight

  • December 2011

    “Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law” by William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, and Halbert L. White

  • December 2011

    Case study: Comcast/NBC Universal merger 

  • May 2011

    Leslie Marx submits statement regarding AT&T/T-Mobile USA proposed merger

  • December 2009

    “Quantitative Analysis of Coordinated Effects” by Robert Marshall, Leslie Marx, and Steve Schulenberg, Antitrust Law Journal

  • Summer 2009

    “Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms” by Randal Heeb, Robert Marshall, and Leslie Marx, Chicago Journal of International Law

  • May 2009

    “The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion” by Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx, Quarterly Journal of Economics

  • March 2007

    “Bidder Collusion” by Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx, Journal of Economic Theory

  • 2007

    “Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel” by W. Kovacic, R. Marshall, L. Marx, and M. Raiff, The Political Economy of Antitrust

  • October 2007

    “Bidding rings and the design of anti-collusive measures for auctions and procurements” by W. Kovacic, R. Marshall, L. Marx, and M. Raiff

  • August 2006

    “Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion” by W. Kovacic, R. Marshall, L. Marx, and S. Schulenberg

At the Podium

  • 8 June 2011

    Bates White partners and affiliates participate in DOJ Economic Analysis Group’s seminar series

  • 3 December 2009

    Leslie Marx and Marius Schwartz speak at FTC/DOJ Workshop on Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project

  • 6 September 2006

    Robert Marshall speaks on postmerger collusion at Fordham Competition Law Institute’s annual conference

  • 17–18 February 2005

    Robert Marshall, Leslie Marx, and Matthew Raiff speak at Remedies and Sanctions Competition Policy Conference in Amsterdam