1300 Eye Street NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005
phone: 202.408.6110
fax: 202.408.7838
PhD, Economics, Northwestern University; BS, Mathematics, Duke University
Leslie M. Marx is a professor of economics at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. She is an expert in auctions, vertical contracting, antitrust liability, and cartels. Dr. Marx is well known for her innovative ideas in the areas of industrial organization, applied game theory, auctions, procurements, and collusion.
In In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, Dr. Marx served as a consulting expert. She worked closely with Bates White professionals to examine whether the economic evidence was inconsistent with noncooperative conduct during a period of time predating the defendants’ guilty pleas.
Dr. Marx also provided an expert report and deposition testimony for Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation in litigation that concerned Oxford Health Plans’ settlement negotiations in a securities class action lawsuit.
Dr. Marx has published extensively in peer-reviewed journals and elsewhere on topics related to industrial organization, applied game theory, auctions, procurements, and collusion. Her published work includes papers on collusive mechanisms, incentives in procurement contracting, slotting allowances, and exclusive dealing.
Areas of expertise
Spotlights
Events
Marius Schwartz and Leslie Marx to speak at FTC/DOJ Workshop on Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project
Press releases
Robert Marshall, Leslie Marx, and Matthew Raiff awarded Paul Geroski Best Article Prize for paper
on cartel price announcements
William E. Kovacic,
Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, and Matthew E. Raiff publish chapter on
bidding rings and anticollusive measures in Handbook of Procurement
Publications
Robert Marshall, Leslie Marx, and
Steve Schulenberg, “Quantitative Analysis of Coordinated Effects,” Antitrust Law Journal
Randal Heeb, Robert Marshall, and Leslie Marx, “Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct,”
Chicago Journal of International Law
“The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion”