Robert C. Marshall, PhD

Partner

PhD, Economics, University of California, San Diego; AB, Economics, Princeton University

Robert C. Marshall is a Liberal Arts Research Professor, Head of the Economics Department, and co-Director of the Center for the Study of Auctions, Procurements, and Competition Policy at the Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Marshall works closely with our clients to provide intellectual leadership in antitrust litigation. Dr. Marshall is a recognized thought leader in the areas of industrial organization, applied game theory, auctions, procurements, and collusion.

Dr. Marshall has testified before Congress regarding incentives in procurement contracting. He has served on two panels for the National Research Council. As Head of the Department of Economics at The Pennsylvania State University for the past 15 years, he has led the Department through a significant transformation.

Dr. Marshall has published extensively in peer-reviewed journals and elsewhere on topics related to industrial organization, applied game theory, auctions, procurements, and collusion. His published work includes papers on collusive mechanisms, detecting bidder collusion at Forest Service Timber auctions, differential payments within a bidder coalition, and incentives in procurement contracting.

Selected Experience

Provided liability expert report and deposition testimony for several direct and indirect plaintiffs in In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation.
Provided expert report and deposition testimony in an analysis of class certification issues in In re Ready-Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litigation. Analysis examined suitability of class-wide treatment. Critically assessed assertions made by plaintiffs’ economic expert.
Provided liability expert report and deposition testimony for a large coalition of direct-action plaintiffs involved in a complex horizontal conspiracy matter in In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation.
Submitted declaration regarding the allocation of settlement funds and the pass-through of price increases for diamonds in Sullivan v. DB Investments.
Provided liability expert report and deposition testimony regarding the existence of collusive behavior on behalf of more than 100 direct action plaintiffs in In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation.
Provided expert report and deposition testimony regarding an auction of a professional sports franchise, working on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division.
Performed general game theory instruction for a consortium of telecommunication bidders interested in bidding for FCC spectrum.

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Areas of expertise

Antitrust damages
Antitrust liability
Applied econometrics
Auctions and procurements
Collusion
Game theory
Government contracting
Industrial organization

Spotlights

Events
Dr. Robert C. Marshall presented at FTC/DOJ hearing on single-firm conduct and Section 2 of the Sherman Act

Dr. Robert C. Marshall spoke on postmerger collusion at Fordham Competition Law Institute’s annual conference Paper available for download here

Dr. Robert C. Marshall spoke on anticollusion measures at LSI’s International Cartels seminar

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Dr. Robert Marshall discussed the benefits of competition in federal procurement at a public meeting for the Acquisition Advisory Panel
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Publications
“Quantitative Analysis of Coordinated Effects,” (with William E. Kovacic, Leslie M. Marx, and Stephen P. Schulenberg), 2009, Antitrust Law Journal

“Cartel Price Announcements: The Vitamins Industry,” (with Leslie M. Marx and Matthew E. Raiff), 2008, International Journal of Industrial Organization. 26(3), 762-802. Winner of the The Paul Geroski Best Paper Award 2009 for one of two best papers published in the journal in 2008.

“Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct,” (with Randal D. Heeb, William E. Kovacic, and Leslie Marx), 2009 Chicago Journal of International Law

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“The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion” (with Leslie M. Marx) 2009, Quarterly Journal of Economics.

“The Measurement of Economic Damages in Antitrust Civil Litigation,” 2006, (with Halbert White [primary author], and Pauline Kennedy), 2006, Economics Committee Newsletter, American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Spring.

“Bidder Collusion,” 2007, (with Leslie M. Marx) Journal of Economic Theory.

“Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel” 2007, (with William E. Kovacic, Leslie M. Marx, and Matthew E. Raiff), The Political Economy of Antitrust, edited by Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek, Elsevier, Chapter 6.

“Bidding Rings and the Design of Anti-Collusion Measures for Auctions and Procurements” (with William E. Kovacic, Leslie M. Marx, and Matthew E. Raiff), 2006, Handbook of Procurement, edited by N. Dimitri, G. Piga and G. Spagnolo, Cambridge University Press, 381-411.

“Coordinated Effects in Merger Review: Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion,” 2006, (with William E. Kovacic, Leslie M. Marx, Steven P. Schulenberg), International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2006, ed. B. Hawk. (Juris Publishing), Chapter 13.

“The Impact of Delivery Synergies on Bidding in the Georgia School Milk Market,” 2006, (with Matthew E. Raiff, Jean-Francois Richard, and Steven P. Schulenberg), Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy.
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